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Abstract 
The uncertainty of COVID-19 seriously disrupts the Congolese economy through various 
macroeconomic channels. This pandemic is influencing the management of monetary 
policy in its role as regulator of aggregate demand and guarantor of macroeconomic 
stability. We use a Bayesian VAR framework (BVAR) to provide an analysis of the COVID 
uncertainty shock on the economy and the monetary policy response. The analysis shows 
important conclusions. The uncertainty effect of COVID-19 hits unprecedented aggregate 
demand and the economy. In addition, it undermines the action of monetary policy to 
soften this fall in aggregate demand and curb inflation impacted by the exchange rate 
effect. We suggest a development of unconventional devices for a gradual recovery of the 
economy. 
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1. Introduction 
The Covid-19 pandemic (COronaVIrus Disease, 19 indicating its nomenclature) has 
heightened doubt, devastated economies with a click or just like with a magic wand and 
above all increased uncertainty in this uncertain world. Many events throughout history 
have sparked uncertainty in the global economy. More than fair in the past decade, 
uncertainty has increased in response to the spillover effects of the Great Recession, the 
European sovereign debt crisis, the Ebola epidemic, the collapse of commodity prices basic, 
to trade tensions between the United States and China, on Brexit and the Asian conflicts, 
tensions between the United States and Iran ... The last wave of uncertainty arose from 
the rapid global spread COVID-19 disease (figure 2 and 3), and this pandemic has redefined 
the global economic and monetary landscape (Liu, 2020). The virus has spread worldwide 
and infected nearly 2,810,325 peoples as of April 27, 2020, causing thousands of deaths 
(figure 1). In this pandemic, infrastructure is disrupted, such as health systems, transport, 
commerce and public services. To slow the rate of spread of the virus, the authorities have 
adopted containment measures, in particular, the isolation of confirmed patients, the 
quarantine for two weeks of those who have been exposed to these patients, social 
distancing (including the closing of schools, the cancellation of large gatherings, 
teleworking and travel restrictions) and the total containment of certain cities2. 
Figure 1.a. COVID-19 death case (April 27, 2020) 
 
Source : World Health Organization, COVID-19 Global data 
 
Underestimation of the uncertainty risks giving rise to strategies which will prove just as 
powerless to protect the national economy against the dangers which threaten it as to 
make it take advantage of the opportunities and challenges possibly generated by higher 
levels of uncertainty (Courtney and al., 2000). This unpredictable situation should shake up 
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 These measures could slow transmission, and make it possible to buy up time by easing the pressure on 
hospitals and researchers to potentially develop best treatment practices and even less, make a vaccine. 
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
USA
Brazil
Italy
Spain
France
United Kingdom
Belgium
Germany
China
India
Indonesia
Iran
Israel
Japan
Algeria
Ghana
South Africa
Nigeria
Congo,DRC
Gabon
3 
 
monetary policy, which we believe is the essential tool if we want to reach systematically 
valid strategic decisions in an uncertain environment of COVID-19. 
Figure 1.b. Regional confirmation cases from CIVID-19 to April 27, 2020
 
Source : World Health Organization, COVID-19 Global data 
It is not easy to predict the economic impact of the virus, given the uncertainty about the 
spread of the virus and the scarcity of similar events that could provide useful empirical 
evidence. The blow to economic growth is deep, countries will have to enter a recessionary 
whirlwind but its ultimate scale and duration are very uncertain and will depend on the 
capacity for vigorous measures, in principle a very accommodative monetary policy to 
support global demand and finance public health health infrastructure to contain the 
spread of the pandemic. 
The evidence suggests a clear landscape in which periods of increased uncertainty are 
followed by a persistent increase in the unemployment rate, price instability (inflation and 
/ or deflation), lower confidence, a disruption in the exchange rate, and a slowdown or 
recession in economic activity (Leduc and Liu, 2020), despite monetary policy action, the 
spillover effects are even harder, which requires a strategy during and after the crisis. 
However, the best strategy to adopt in the future would be that of the conspirator, that is, 
to prepare adequately for crisis scenarios, even if it is difficult to predict crises accurately. 
However the development of Early Warning Indicators could still be useful. Public 
authorities often do not take these weak signals into account (the leading indicators), what 
Portal and Roux-Dufort (2013) call the cassanders. These cassandres are not often listened 
to by the public authorities and create disasters and economic and financial disasters. 
These indicators are very useful in crisis prevention and help to mitigate the disruptive 
effects of a major crisis. 
 
Figures 2 and 3 measure economic fear and uncertainty by a frequently used indicator, the 
VIX (Volatility index) and the WUI (World uncertainty index). These indicators have climbed 
during this pandemic, reaching levels higher than that recorded during the 2008 financial 
crisis. Thus, by increasing uncertainty, the coronavirus affects economies in a similar way 
to a drop in demand overall, which central banks normally try to compensate by reducing 
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policy rates and easing financial conditions and liquidity. The COVID-19 epidemic has 
severely disrupted economic activity through various supply and demand channels. The 
pandemic can also be ubiquitous for 1 year and increasingly increase macroeconomic 
uncertainty and declining aggregate demand. Adaptation to monetary policy, such as 
interest rate cuts and unconventional measures, can help cushion the economy from such 
uncertainty shocks and stem this pandemic storm (Thomas, 2016). 
 
Figure 2. VIX  
 
Source : Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index. 
The fear of COVID-19 illustrated by the VIX (Figure 2) deeply threatens the economies, drags 
down all the forecasts expected in 2020. It should be noted that countries find themselves 
in another scenario that we must go with and deploy lax and intelligent measures to reduce 
this level of uncertainty via the coronavirus which dims economic hopes. At the same time, 
The WUI, the global pandemic uncertainty index, shows that the level of uncertainty 
associated with COVID-19 is unprecedented. In addition, it is more important than the level 
caused by uncertainty during the 2002-2003 SARS epidemic and approximately 20 times 
greater than the Ebola epidemic (Ahir et al., 2020). The WUI illustrates the uncertainty 
effects linked to the various crises and imbalances causing fairly persistent ripple effects. 
The uncertainty of COVID-19 has greatly exceeded that of the financial crisis and goes 
beyond all the crises we have experienced since 1970 (Figure 3), it is a whole new level. 
Central banks should react quickly because every minute counts and the spread continues 
to devastate. According to forecasts, the acceleration of the spread takes place 
exponentially (Kibala, 2020), hence the speed of the reaction of the central banks is 
essential to temporarily relax regulatory constraints and develop contingency plans and to 
be ready providing sufficient liquidity to financial institutions, especially those that lend to 
small and medium-sized enterprises, which may be less well-equipped to withstand this 
prolonged uncertainty (Berger et al., 2020). 
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Figure 3. WUI-COVID-19  
 
Source : World uncertainty index, https://worlduncertaintyindex.com/ 
 
The Congolese economy, which is super dependent on world economic conditions, sees its 
economic apparatus mechanically degraded, following the uncertainty of COVID-19. 
Although cases of death and contamination in Africa are still lower (0.7% of contamination 
worldwide, figure 1.b), the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has recorded 442 cases of 
contamination, and the progression is increasing more and more (Figure 4). The public 
authorities have confined some cities, such as Kinshasa, and prohibit any gathering of 
people in public spaces. Passenger flights from abroad are not allowed and some border 
posts are closed. Other measures are taken such as the closure of schools, the suspension 
of all religious and sporting events and the closure of bars and restaurants. 
The effects of the COVID-19 pandemic should reduce real GDP growth, as the mining sector 
is affected (the lever of the Congolese economy), increase consumer prices, reduce 
government revenues and increase budget spending following the implementation of a 
response plan to COVID-19. To a large extent, this will affect net exports. In terms of 
imports, the DRC's dependence on China is enormous. The majority of goods and services 
imported by the DRC come from China, which represents a notable supply in a large part 
of the Congolese economy, then the euro zone. The fall in commodity prices will weigh 
heavily on the Congolese economy and impact investments in this sector. 
Table 1 shows the economic landscape of the DRC in recent years. It should be noted that 
the strong connection and integration of the DRC, with a degree of openness hovering 
around 75%, the effects of the epidemic are felt directly, businesses, whatever their size, 
dependent on global inputs and Chinese have started to experience production 
contractions, and must prepare for the worst scenario of a recession. The economy 
experienced a common disruption in 2015 following a sharp drop in commodities, which 
brutally affected all macroeconomic sectors in the country (Pinshi, 2018). At a time when 
the spillover effects are still scratching the economic landscape, the shock of COVID-19 
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drives the point home and its uncertain effect will degrade the economy as a whole. 
Forecasts estimate a recession of 2.2%, an increase in consumer prices of 11%, a widening of 
the current account deficit of 5.4%. 
Figure 4. DRC: Confirmed cases over time (March 11 to April 27) 
 
Source : World Health Organization, COVID-19 Global data 
Structural ruptures and experience over time make it clear that uncertainty is a pervasive 
feature of the monetary policy landscape (Greespan, 2004). In practice, one is never quite 
sure of the type of uncertainty that one faces in real time, it would be preferable for the 
conduct of monetary policy to insert at its base, crucial elements of crisis management. In 
essence, the risk and crisis management approach in monetary policy making is an 
application of Bayesian decision-making. The uncertainty of the COVID-19 pandemic poses 
unprecedented challenges for the conduct of monetary policy. 
Table 1. Economic outlook in the DRC 
 
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Real GDP (%) 9,4 6,9 2,4 3,7 5,8 4,2 -2,2 
Degree of openness (% PIB) 78,6 59,3 55,9 74,2 70,9 70,9  
Inflation (average) 1,24 0,7 3,1 35,7 29,2 5,5 11,0 
General government net 
lending / borrowing (% GDP) 
-0,02 -0,4 -0,5 1,3 0,4 -0,08  
Policy rate 2 2 7 20 14 9 7,5 
Monetary base (%) 12,19 23,24 27,92 21,34 27,21 44,29  
Current account (% GDP) -4,73 -3,85 -4,1 -3,22 -4,61 -3,45 -5,4 
Exchange rate (End of 
period) 
924,5 926,7 1215,5 1592,1 1635,6 1672,9 1800 
 Source : IMF, International Financial Statistics and world outlook economic ; BIS Statistics Explorer ; World 
Bank Group, World Development Indicators ; BCC 
 
Structural ruptures and experience over time make it clear that uncertainty is a pervasive 
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sure of the type of uncertainty that one faces in real time, it would be preferable for the 
conduct of monetary policy to insert at its base, crucial elements of crisis management. In 
essence, the risk and crisis management approach in monetary policy making is an 
application of Bayesian decision-making. The uncertainty of the COVID-19 pandemic poses 
unprecedented challenges for the conduct of monetary policy. 
In the past, central banks have deployed abnormal (unconventional) and very 
accommodative measures to deal with the financial crisis. This time the threat is much 
more viscous, we should be more vigilant and reactive. The Congolese monetary policy 
framework suffers from an uncertain effect of the pass-through of its policy rate, the latter, 
the main operational framework of monetary policy, has difficulty influencing aggregate 
demand. This situation, combined with the uncertainty of COVID-19, should push the 
Central Bank to develop strategic plans which would be abnormal and unconventional, 
because at present, the Central Bank is the institution which should play a major role in 
mitigating the COVID-19 Uncertainty Shock. The depreciation of the exchange rate and the 
anticipated price instability must alert the Bank to be more vigilant, because adjusting the 
economy is not like adjusting a light bulb, it is more like shutting down a reactor nuclear. It 
must be done slowly and carefully, otherwise it melts down (Cochrane, 2020). 
To combat this uncertainty of COVID-19, which has contaminated the Congolese economy 
towards a recession which may prove to be lasting, the Central Bank of Congo (BCC) has 
lowered its policy rate to 7.5% and its coefficient of the reserve requirement on sight 
deposits in national currency at 0%, followed by an increase in the monetary base of 50%. 
On the sidelines the BCC has planned to provide liquidity to banks so as to allow them to 
ease the financial conditions of access to credit; to set up a special refinancing window with 
a maturity ranging from 3 to 24 months. 
This article focuses on the economic impact of COVID-19 through its effect on uncertainty 
and the response of monetary policy, which is the quintessential strategy against a major 
crisis. This paper would provide policy makers with strategies on the economic benefits of 
policy responses, particularly those of monetary policy. The article first summarizes the 
existing literature on the macroeconomic costs of diseases. 
The article reviews in section 2 a review of the literature on macroeconomic costs following 
the various shocks, uncertainty and the COVID pandemic. Section 3 traces the balance 
sheet of the central bank of the Congo over the years. Section 4 describes the methodology 
used for the study. Section 5 presents the results using the model. Section 5 assesses 
monetary policy responses. Section 6 concludes the document. 
 
2. Literature  
Uncertainty is a fact which, given its magnitude, deserves much greater attention by 
decision-makers in the formulation of monetary policy and in crisis management (Brainard, 
1967; Thiessen, 1995; Greespan, 2004; Walsh, 2003; Bloom, 2009; Brock and al., 2003; 
Svensson and Williams, 2005; D'Arvisenet, 2014). The coronavirus shock has increased the 
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uncertainty surrounding the evolution of global demand, prices, confidence, fear, 
investment, in short the economic and social apparatus. Drumetz and al., 2015 identify 
three key factors in understanding the uncertainty that central banks should take into 
account, uncertainty regarding the state of the economy, that relating to the structure of 
the economy and finally the more important for decision-makers in the intervention, 
strategic uncertainty. These factors are very difficult to determine by empirical methods 
(Baker and al., 2013; Bernanke, 1980), it must therefore be recognized that even with a 
better understanding of the macroeconomic and financial cogs, the impact of uncertainty 
on driving of monetary policy is important. 
Uncertainty is pervasive, it is important to understand how alternative policies fare when 
the central bank cannot accurately observe important macroeconomic variables or when 
it uses a model of the economy that is incorrectly incorrect unknown (Walsh, 2003). It is 
particularly important to look for strategies capable of delivering good macroeconomic 
results, even when structural changes and / or shock occur continuously, in this case COVID-
19. The latter is evolving exponentially by sinking all forecasts and exacerbating the impact 
of uncertainty in all economic sectors and in the world (Ozili and Arun, 2020). 
 
To measure the effect of uncertainty on the economy, Bloom (2009) uses the VAR model 
to estimate the impact of uncertainty. Its results show that uncertainty seems to surge 
after major shocks such as the Cuban missile crisis, the oil shock and the September 11th 
terrorist attacks. And its spillover effects are driving down production and investment. In 
the same vein, Baker and al, (2016) develops an index of economic policy uncertainty, with 
a VAR model, he concludes that uncertainty increases volatility in the financial system and 
prices at general levels, reduces investment and lowers employment. 
 
Aastveity and al. (2013) examine the effect of uncertainty on changing the macroeconomic 
influence of monetary policy. They use an SVAR model to estimate the interactions of the 
uncertainty effect with the shock of monetary policy for the US economy and then for 
Canada, the United Kingdom and Norway. They find that monetary policy shocks affect 
considerably weaker economic activity when uncertainty is high. In addition, investment 
responds two to five times lower when the uncertainty is in its top decile instead of its 
bottom decile. The analysis by Caggiano and al., (2017), illustrates the role of monetary 
policy in countering the real effects of uncertainty shocks in US recessions and expansions. 
Using a VAR model, they find that the uncertainty shocks that hit recessions trigger a 
steeper decline. Counterfactual simulations suggest that the effectiveness of systematic 
monetary policy in stabilizing real activity is greater in expansions. Finally, they provide 
empirical and narrative evidence pointing to a risk management approach by the Federal 
Reserve. 
Assessing the macroeconomic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic is essential for 
policymakers, but difficult because the crisis is unfolding at an extreme speed. To better 
understand its impact, Baker and al. (2020). analyze the effect of COVID-19 uncertainty on 
the US economy, their results imply an annual contraction of US real GDP of nearly 11% in 
the fourth quarter of 2020, with a 90% confidence interval extending to a contraction of 
almost 20%. They indicate that approximately 60% of the expected contraction in 
production reflects a negative effect of the uncertainty induced by COVID-19. Likewise, 
Leduc and Liu (2020) study the channel of uncertainty of the coronavirus on the American 
economy and the Fed's responses. Using macroeconometric analysis of impulse response 
9 
 
functions, he shows that the uncertainty shock of COVID-19 has seriously disrupted 
economic activity through various supply and demand channels. They also show that the 
pandemic could have a widespread economic impact by increasing uncertainty. And this 
leads to a large and prolonged increase in unemployment and a fall in inflation. This effect 
of uncertainty lowers overall demand. They suggest adaptable or accommodative 
monetary policy action, such as lower interest rates, can help cushion the economy from 
such uncertainty shocks. 
 
In Japan, Watanabe (2020) compares consumption and price responses to the COVID-19 
shock and another large-scale natural disaster that struck Japan, the Tohoku earthquake in 
2011. The comparison shows that responses on a daily frequency during the two crises are 
quite similar: the rate of sales growth increased rapidly and peaked at 20% two weeks after 
the COVID-19 epidemic in Japan, which is quite similar to the response immediately after 
the earthquake; the annual consumer price inflation rate for goods increased by 0.6 
percentage points in response to the coronavirus shock, compared to 2.2 percentage 
points following the earthquake. However, the findings suggest that if people expected 
higher inflation for goods and services following the earthquake, they would expect lower 
inflation in response to the coronavirus shock. This difference in inflation expectations 
suggests that the economic deterioration due to COVID-19 should be considered mainly 
due to an adverse shock in aggregate demand for face-to-face service industries such as 
hotels and entertainment, transportation and retail, rather than as induced by an overall 
supply shock. 
 
Ozili (2020) illustrates the overall effect of the coronavirus on the Nigerian economy. It 
shows the drop in oil prices linked to coronavirus shock has significantly lowered economic 
growth. The Nigerian government has responded to the crisis by providing financial 
assistance to businesses that have been affected by the epidemic. The central bank 
adopted accommodative monetary policies and offered targeted support of 3.5 billion 
loans to certain sectors. These efforts should have prevented the economic crisis from 
happening, but it did not. Economic agents have refused to engage in economic activity for 
fear of contracting Covid-19 disease, which is spreading very quickly. He concludes that the 
structural weaknesses of Nigerian infrastructure are contributing to the persistence of the 
crisis and proposes a perspective for structural reform. 
 
Some studies have been conducted in the DRC to measure the impact of the exogenous 
shock on the economy, such as Izu in 2016 and Ntungila and Pinshi in 2019. Their studies 
have shown that economic growth is not resilient and is super dependent on the shock of 
raw materials. They suggest an operational framework for the mining fund for economic 
adjustment and stabilization during periods of downturn and / or recession. Similarly, Pinshi 
(2018), using the VAR model, assesses the macroeconomic effects of falling commodity 
prices and finds an important channel for external shock, which undermines all 
macroeconomic frameworks of the country and leads to a systemic crisis. 
 
These analyzes have mounted the impact of uncertainty on economies, it turned out that 
this impact is disproportionate and has significant spillover effects. `` Unlike these studies, 
this article examines the impact of the COVID-19 uncertainty shock on the economy; the 
article then measures the impact of monetary policy during this period of COVID-19 
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uncertainty on aggregate demand and the response of the central bank to contain and 
reduce the effect of uncertainty on the economy. 
 
 
3. Balance sheet of Congolese Central Bank (BCC) 
The central bank's balance sheet plays an important role in managing liquidity and 
regulating aggregate demand (Zorn and Garcia, 2011; Bagus and Howden, 2016). In 
response to the crisis, many central banks are adopting policies which considerably 
increase the size and change the composition of their balance sheets, in particular by 
extending the scope of existing facilities, in particular the duration of usual refinancing 
operations and lower the collateral eligibility standards applied to banks. But central banks 
have also devised new mechanisms, expanding the availability of credit to financial 
institutions, reducing policy interest rates and purchasing money-financed assets from 
high-power money (the basis monetary), so-called monetary easing. 
 
Over the past decade, many central bank balance sheets have grown to an unprecedented 
scale, and to levels significantly exceeding the minimum size generally determined by bank 
notes in circulation and other stand-alone liabilities. Analytical work has often focused on 
the channels through which the expansion of the central bank balance sheet affects policy 
transmission and financial conditions (BIS, 2019). 
 
The BCC's balance sheet has increased dramatically (figure 5), since the shock of 
commodity prices in 2015, the size of the balance sheet has increased by 162%. This increase 
is a response to the influence of monetary policy on financial and macroeconomic 
conditions, in order to increase the degree of monetary accommodation and support 
aggregate demand. 
 
 
Source : BCC 
 
In response to this pandemic, there is a need to respond to financial tensions and ease the 
recession, in line with the traditional function of central banks as the ultimate provider of 
funding guarantees to the banking system. The BCC is called upon to improve the 
transmission of the envisaged orientation of monetary policy in the presence of COVID-19 
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and to further soften its balance sheet by exerting downward pressure on the policy rate 
and developing an unconventional operating framework, in the event of the persistence of 
the shock. 
 
 
4. Methodology 
Our objective is to estimate how the uncertainty of COVID-19 influences on the one hand 
the economy and on the other hand, the transmission of monetary policy shocks in the 
DRC. We use monthly data covering the period from 2009 m1 to 2020 m4. 
 
4.1. Measuring COVID uncertainty 
As the main measure of uncertainty, we use the VIX index used by several researchers 
(Bloom, 2009; Bekaert and al., 2010; Aastveity and al., 2013; Leduc and Liu, 2020), these 
data are extracted from the Chicago Board Options Exchange. In addition, we use the 
Global Pandemic Uncertainty Index (WPUI) constructed by Ahir and al. (2018), which is 
broader and takes into account the different crises, epidemics (SARS, Ebola, COVID-19,…), 
wars, shock of raw materials,… These data are extracted from the 
worlduncertaintyindex.com database. The special feature of this index is that its 
methodology was updated on April 4, 2020 and also measures discussions on the COVID-19 
pandemic at global and national levels. 
 
4.2. Measuring the economy, aggregate demand and monetary policy 
To measure the economy and aggregate demand, we use real GDP, the consumer price 
index, aggregate consumption (summation of private and public consumption), 
investment, the degree of openness. The monetary base and the policy rate are used as 
the shock of monetary policy to act on the economy and aggregate demand. However, as 
we know, the Congolese economy is dollarized, the agents adapt their anticipations to the 
variations of the exchange rate and not only to the evolution of inflation. Pinshi and 
Sungani (2018) demonstrated this by analyzing the exchange rate pass-through and the 
monetary policy regime in the DRC, where they found the great influence of exchange rate 
variations on prices at the general level, with a more than proportional variation. Following 
the relevance of the exchange rate pass-through in the conduct of monetary policy, we will 
also use the nominal exchange rate (Congolese franc Cdf / dollar Usd). 
 
4.3. Model 
Recent research carried out in the specialized literature, based on dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium models (DSGE) or on Bayesian vector autoregression models (BVAR) 
play an important role in the process of monetary policy implementation (Spulbăr and al., 
2011). Bayesian techniques can be used to provide parameter estimates when the models 
include many variables. These methods can also be used to provide coefficient estimates 
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that are not biased, when the variables contain unit roots. Increasingly, empirical evidence 
suggests that Bayesian VAR produces macroeconomic forecasts and analyzes that 
establish a high level of comparison for most alternative macroeconometric methods 
(Kenny and al., 1998; Carare and Popescu, 2011). In addition, the BVAR solves the problem 
of over-parametrization by imposing parameter restrictions (Litterman, 1986; Sims and 
Zha, 1998; Koop and Korobilis, 2010). 
 
To investigate how the uncertainty of COVID-19 affects the economy and the conduct of 
monetary policy, we estimate a BVAR model. The particularity of this approach is that the 
variation over time in the effect of monetary policy is directly linked to a specific 
determinant, uncertainty. 
We will not provide a detailed framework on each type of Prior, leaving these details to the 
documentation (Doan and al., 1984; Bańbura and al., 2010; Litterman 1986; Sims and Zha 
1998; Koop, 2003). However, we will provide a summary with sufficient detail to 
demonstrate how an initial covariance matrix influences a prior. 
 
We estimate the impact of the COVID-19 uncertainty shock on the economy using a BVAR 
framework. It should be noted that in our exercise, we will also quantify to what extent the 
response of endogenous variables to monetary policy actions changes with the level of 
uncertainty. We use the following model : 
 𝑋𝑡 = ∑ Φ𝑗𝑋𝑡−𝑗 + Θ𝑗𝜁𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡𝑝𝑗=1                          𝜀𝑡 ∼ 𝑁(0, ∑)       (1)    
Where 𝜀𝑡 is a vector of residuals of reduced form at time t. The vector 𝑋𝑡  contains, the 
uncertainty index WPUI, real GDP, the consumer price index, total consumption, 
investment, the degree of openness, monetary base, policy rate and exchange rate 
nominal. The VIX uncertainty index 𝜁𝑡  is an uncertainty variable constructed specifically to 
monitor the behavior of the American market, given that it is the dominant economy with 
a systemic effect, the majority of economies, including the DRC, of this index instills 
uncertainty in the dynamism of other economies. Therefore, the VIX index is assumed to 
be exogenous in the model. 
If we define 𝑦 = (𝑋𝑡 + 𝜁𝑡)′              (2),  the multivariate normal assumption on 𝜀𝑡 gives us :  (𝑦|β) ∼ 𝑁(𝑌 ⊗ 𝐼𝑚)𝛽, 𝐼𝑇 ⊗ Σ)              (3) 
 
The BVAR estimate will focus on the derivation of the posterior distributions of 𝛽  and Σ 
based on the multivariate distribution above, and the earlier distribution hypotheses on 𝛽 
and Σ. 
We use a Gaussian prior specific to our model, we opt for Litterman / Minnesota since it 
reduces the problem of specifying a priori distribution of high dimension to one of the two 
selection parameters by imposing an additional structure on the prior. We specify the prior 
and covariance prior matrix as follows : 
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𝛽 ∼ 𝑁(𝛽𝑛 , 𝜈𝑖𝑗)     𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 𝛽 = 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝜈 ≠ 0            (4)  𝜈 is a diagonal matrix with the elements ν_ (ij, p) at delay p, the specification takes the 
following form : 
𝜈𝑖𝑗,𝑝 = {  (𝜆1 𝑝𝜆3⁄ )2  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 𝑗   (𝜆1𝜆2𝜎𝑖 𝑝𝜆3 𝜎𝑗⁄ )2  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗(𝜆4𝜎𝑖)             (5)  
Where 𝜆𝑖  are hyper-parameters, and 𝜎𝑖  is the square root of the ith diagonal element of Σ. 
The Litterman / Minnesota prior assumes that Σ is fixed, not priorizing Σ, simply using the 
initial estimate given. 
All data are expressed in logarithms (except the policy rate), then the difference operator 
is applied. 
 
5. Empirical results 
We estimate how the uncertainty of COVID-19 affects the economy and how aggregate 
demand and the economy reacts to the shock (intervention) of monetary policy. 
 
5.1. COVID-19 uncertainty shock 
Figure 6 plots the estimated dynamic responses of the economy to a COVID-19 uncertainty 
shock. The uncertainty of COVID-19 would lead to a lasting drop in production in the DRC, 
at least for 20 months. This drop is drastic and mechanical. This will plunge the economy 
back into recessions and depressions. This shock from COVID-19 would germinate 
macroeconomic instability, the inflation rate from the 6th month would increase until 
reaching an unpleasant level, this would be sustainable, according to our estimates. The 
close relationship between the depreciation of the exchange rate and inflation supports 
this result, according to which, the chance rate would depreciate sharply from the 4th 
month following the shock of uncertainty. This would further lead to a major loss in the 
constitution of mattresses for international reserves. 
The components of aggregate demand and the degree of openness respond passively and 
negatively due to the increased uncertainty of COVID-19. Investment drops drastically, 
around 22 months. This effect would paralyze the economy towards its path of emergence 
and hamper economic development. The response of the degree of openness is passive 
and incompressible. It would stagnate for at least 18 months, which would put the 
economy at a disastrous level, especially since the DRC is highly dependent on external 
demand. This would exacerbate the duration of the recession. 
The overall consumption would suffer a different effect, certainly the decline would be felt 
at least for 4 months. However, the estimate shows an increase for overall consumption 
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up to the 12th month. This is explained by the fact that public expenditure would not cease 
to increase in order to deal with the crisis and above all to meet the needs for health and 
payment compensation for certain sectors, such as electricity, water, etc. This increase in 
consumption could perhaps in certain cases play a role in the economic recovery. 
The combined reaction of all these macroeconomic variables suggests that the uncertainty 
affects the Congolese economy in a similar way to an economic brake and a systemic 
disturbance. Thus, due to uncertainty, the COVID-19 pandemic has important effects on 
demand such as confidence, in addition to effects on supply such as the closing of certain 
businesses, the disruption of supply chains. supply, labor shortage and reduced service 
provision. 
 
5.2. Monetary policy shock taking into account uncertainty 
Monetary policy acts on aggregate demand and curbs inflation. The uncertainty shock of 
COVID-19 had a terrible impact on them. Monetary policy should act flexibly as soon as 
possible. Figure 7 plots the average statistical effects of a monetary policy shock via the 
decline in the policy rate on aggregate demand and inflation. Production responds 
unfavorably to the drop in the policy rate. There followed an unprecedented recession, at 
least for 22 months. The situation turns out to be of an extreme dimension that the 
conventional operational framework of monetary policy has no effect on aggregate 
demand, since the uncertainty of COVID-19 is very threatening for the Congolese economy. 
As for inflation, its control would pose a serious problem for the central bank, since the 
depreciation of the exchange rate would be lasting. Monetary policy action to curb 
inflation is expected to focus on defending the currency and smoothing exchange rate 
fluctuations. 
The investment does not react to the low of the policy rate, the drop in investment would 
be lasting. Likewise for consumption and the degree of openness, policy rate alone could 
not stimulate aggregate demand. 
Like the policy rate, the response of monetary policy via the increase in its balance sheet, 
the monetary base (Figure 8), still does not succeed in boosting the economy and 
controlling inflation. Using our estimated model, we can assess the likely magnitude and 
duration of the effects of uncertainty related to the COVID-19 pandemic. The central bank 
should quickly bring the policy rate down to the effective lower limit and gradually increase 
the size of its balance sheet in the hope of a clear effect. However, we think that we should 
rethink the unconventional operational framework for a rather formidable attack against 
the uncertainty of COVID-19. The following section attempts to suggest some strategic 
responses for monetary policy during this uncertain period. 
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6. Monetary policy responses 
Central banks have powerful cards to remedy a major crisis by adopting new devices, 
mainly in response to instability (Smaghi, 2016). The BCC has implemented measures to 
ease liquidity conditions. However, these measures do not appear to affect aggregate 
demand and the economy. 
Admittedly, this pandemic will hit the economy hard in a recession and even monetary 
policy could not stem this recession with certainty, but it can ease the peak of economic 
uncertainty and contribute to a gradual recovery of the economy. economy. To achieve 
this, targeted responses would be required, since the increase in aggregate demand would 
be undermined by the imbalance in aggregate supply (Kovanen, 2020), the objective rather 
consists in preserving, as much as possible, viable businesses and jobs until return to 
normal conditions. It should be mentioned that even when the short-term policy rate is 
very low, tending towards the zero point, central banks can still stimulate demand thanks 
to unconventional measures (Odendahl and al., 2020). 
The Congolese treasury bill can serve as a useful framework for health care spending and 
support the economy. The massive issuance of this security could breach monetary policy 
to implement an emergency purchasing program in the face of the pandemic. Uncertainty 
over the term of COVID-19 could allow monetary policy to extend the maturity of these 
securities in the longer term. The BCC, which has non-payable liabilities, could create 
money which will then be fed back into the banking circuit and finance the economy. 
The central bank, as the ultimate insurer of liquidity, should provide abundant liquidity to 
banks and encourage them more to pass on this contribution to small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). This measure could extend and reach the poor and very small 
businesses by widening the scope of refinancing via microfinance and other financial 
institutions that do not have the facilities for a direct refinancing window at the central 
bank (Goodfriend, 2014; Gopinath , 2020). These responses imply a relaxation of collateral 
to carry out these operations and allow the economy to adjust to the recovery. 
The pass-through effect of the exchange rate is accentuated, the central bank must defend 
its currency and at the same time curb inflation. The variation in prices being dependent on 
fluctuations in the exchange rate, A flexible exchange policy would be necessary to reduce 
this instability. In addition, currency swap operations could be beneficial to build a reserve 
cushion and smooth the depreciation of the exchange rate, ultimately curbing inflation. 
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7. Conclusion 
This article estimates the effects of the COVID-19 uncertainty shock on the economy and 
examines the role that monetary policy plays in overcoming this COVID-19 uncertainty. 
Using a Bayesian VAR model, we show that the uncertainty effects of COVID-19 are much 
stronger and affect aggregate demand, prices, the exchange rate, the degree of openness 
and confuse monetary policy interventions. To regulate demand and curb inflation. 
Simulations conducted to assess monetary policy responses indicate that the policy is 
ineffective, and show that it would have no effect for at least 24 months. These empirical 
results have shown that uncertainty reduces the ability of the central bank to influence the 
economy and control inflation. 
Knowing the limits of monetary policy in the face of the pandemic and supply shocks, we 
propose broader responses to combat the effect of uncertainty on aggregate demand and 
the economy, by deploying rather unconventional devices, such as than massive purchases 
of longer-term treasury bonds, excessive liquidity bailouts. However, the central bank 
should intervene in the foreign exchange markets by smoothing the depreciation to curb 
inflation, given the intimate relationship between changes in the exchange rate and 
inflation. These measures could gradually lead to an economic recovery. 
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8. Appendix 
The results of the BVAR model using Minnesota / Litterman a priori on the basis of the 
following values of the hyperparameters ( 𝜆1 = 0,1 ; 𝜆2 = 0,99 ; 𝜆3 = 1 ). 
 
 
Figure 6. COVID-19 uncertainty shock 
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Figure 7. Policy rate shock 
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Figure 8. Shock of the monetary base  
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